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 1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem, purpose and research questions 
1.1.1 Problem 
The introduction of artificial intelligence (AI) has revolutionized technology in many ways. 
Products, such as Apple’s Siri, Amazon’s Alexa and Tesla’s self driving cars are only a few 
of the more known examples of where AI meets human everyday life. These products are 
however late examples of AI-technology. For the military, AI-technology has been around for 
a long time. Depending on which definition of AI is used, a landmine can be argued to 
include AI, and they were first introduced during the American civil war and used on a wide 
scale during the second world war.  Up until the introduction of Autonomous Weapons 1
Systems (AWS) which incorporates AI-technology, weapons had always been seen as 
controlled by humans. As technology has advanced, so have AI, and it has been said that it 
most likely will be possible to construct weapon systems that are ​fully autonomous ​ within 
years, not decades.   2
Fully autonomous weapons systems are systems that operates without human control, 
an example of such systems are lethal autonomous robots (LAR). It is important to state that 
no fully autonomous systems like LAR are yet available.  However, it is believed that once 3
they are, LAR will be able to select and kill its target without human involvement or 
permission.  As fully autonomous systems per definition operate on its own without human 4
control, LAR will challenge many aspects of international law, both in international 
humanitarian law (IHL) and international criminal law (ICL).  
1 “A history of landmines”​ International campaign to stop landmines,​ 2009. 
http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/problem/a-history-of-landmines.aspx  
2 “Autonomous weapons: An Open Letter from AI & Robotics researchers”, ​Future of Life Institute.​ 2015. 
https://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons/  
3 “Mind the Gap: The Lack of Accountability for Killer Robots.” ​Human Rights Watch, International Human 
Rights Clinic​, 2015, 6.  https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms0415_ForUpload_0.pdf 
4 Christof Heyns, “Autonomous weapons systems: living a dignified life and dying a dignified death.” in 
Autonomous Weapons Systems Law, Ethics and Policy, ​edited by Nehal Bhuta, Susanne Beck, Robin Gre​ß, 
Hin-Yan Liu and Claus Kreß​. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 14. 
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 The IHL principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution are what create 
obligations for combatants in war. Combatants have to make sure that LAR or Lethal 
Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) fulfill these IHL requirements before they are used. 
Those who decide or plan an attack involving these weapons need to make sure that the 
requirements can be fulfilled by the combatants. If any of these rules are breached, they can 
all ​individually ​ be held accountable for that under ICL.   5
It has been argued that in between the deployment and use of LAR and criminal 
accountability there opens a gap, aptly named by scholars ​the accountability gap ​.  Scholars, 6
states and non governmental organisations (NGOs) mean that the level of control humans 
need to have over weapons have to be defined.  This to make sure that autonomous weapons 7
stay under human control , both for the sake of avoiding an accountability gap in ICL and for 8
main principles of IHL to be upheld. 
1.1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore what and where the accountability gap between LAR 
and ICL is. By accountability gap, the gap between LAR’s ability conduct criminal acts 
without human control and the requirement of humans for individual accountability in the 
ICC-statute (The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court), is intended. As will be 
described in detail later, the unforeseeability and non-human nature of LAR cause the ICC- 
statute’s forms of accountability to not apply, which results in that individual accountability 
for international crimes caused by LAR cannot be attributed to anyone.  
The purpose of this thesis is further to assess and discuss how to overcome this 
accountability gap between LAR and ICL, in the light of ICL’s goal of ending impunity by 
accountability from a deterrent and retributive perspective. 
5 Neil Davidson, “A Legal perspective: Autonomous Weapon Systems Under International Humanitarian law” 
in ​Perspective on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems ​. (New York, United Nations Publications, 2017), 7-8.  
https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/op30.pdf  
6 ​Michael Kurt Riepl​, “War crimes without criminal accountability? The case of Active Protection Systems.” 
Humanitarian Law & Policy (blog),​ June 1, 2016, 
http://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2016/06/01/war-crimes-without-criminal-accountability-case-active-protecti
on-systems/ 
7 ​Merel Ekelhof​, “Autonomous weapons: Operationalizing meaningful human control” ​Humanitarian Law & 
Policy (blog)​. August 15, 2018.  
http://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2018/08/15/autonomous-weapons-operationalizing-meaningful-human-cont
rol/  
8 ibid. 
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  ​The thesis will assume that there will be an accountability gap between LAR and 
ICL. This because the only subjects the ICC-statute can create accountability for are humans, 
while LAR is non-human. The accountability gap between LAR and ICL therefore concerns 
what subjects the ICC can create accountability for, and how accountability under the 
ICC-statute is affected by the unforeseeable nature in a LAR system.  
There are only a few adequate and wide reaching descriptions available of what and 
where the accountability gap between LAR and ICL is. Many descriptions of it lack diversity 
in perspectives and mostly explores the accountability gap from a point of its existence or 
not. Therefore, yet another description of the accountability gap to use as a basis for a 
discussion of how to overcome will be given. Even though the thesis assumes that there is an 
accountability gap, it is important to show whether or not that is true. 
The reason for choosing to assess and discuss the possibilities of overcoming the 
accountability gap from an ICL perspective is that this perspective is largely overlooked. 
Close to all of the discussions and debates of how to overcome the accountability gap is taken 
from an IHL perspective. This is not strange since LAR “activates” IHL before ICL. It is a 
great discussion in the field of how the previously mentioned IHL-principles stand against 
autonomous systems,  both if decisions over life and death can be delegated to an 9
autonomous weapon system and if an autonomous system can meet requirements of e.g. 
proportionality and distinction.  The weapon review under IHL is something that each state 10
undertakes before introducing a new weapon. It is constructed to make sure that weapons that 
breach international law are not used.  It is argued that the weapon review poses standards so 11
high for e.g foreseeability in the use of weapons  that no LAR will pass the weapon review 12
under article 36 of Additional Protocol I (AP1) and will thus never cause an accountability 
gap for ICL. Hence, most might find it unnecessary to discuss how a weapon that might never 
be used or even exist affects ICL. While we don’t know what the future holds for the 
development of LAR both in relation to article 36 AP1 and its existence at all, we do know 
9 ​Eric Talbo​t ​Jensen, ”The human nature of international humanitarian law”,  ​Humanitarian Law & Policy 
(blog)​, ​August 23, 2018​. 
http://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2018/08/23/human-nature-international-humanitarian-law/  
10 Davidson, “A Legal perspective”, 7-10. 
11 Christopher M. Ford, “CCW remarks”. Third CCW meeting of experts on lethal autonomous weapons 
systems (LAWS) Geneva. 2016, 1. 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/D4FCD1D20DB21431C1257F9B0050B318/$file/2016
_LAWS+MX_presentations_challengestoIHL_fordnotes.pdf 
12 Davidson, “A Legal perspective”, 10.  
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 that systems with high levels of autonomy (but not fully autonomous) are in use today.  As 13
long as the development of all types autonomous systems continues without a regulation of 
meaningful human control (whose definition is hotly debated and will be discussed later), 
there is a possibility that one of the existing systems that have passed the weapon review 
reach new levels of autonomy that approaches levels of full autonomy. As the weapon review 
is also conducted by the contracting states on their own, there is a possibility that different 
states reach different conclusions on how to interpret LAR and other AWS in relation to the 
objectives in the weapon review.  This will result in a fragmented, confusing and conflicting 14
approach to LAR. LAR is not yet a forbidden weapon,  and as long as LAR or any other type 15
of autonomous weapon systems is predicted to be able to kill without human control, it is 
relevant to think about, assess and discuss what implications an accountability gap will have 
on ICL and what can be done to overcome it. This is what the thesis seeks to contribute with. 
1.1.3 Research questions  
To help the purpose, the following two questions will be answered:  
What are the grounds of accountability in international criminal law and how does 
LAR correspond with these forms of accountability?  
In the light of ICL’s goals of ending impunity through accountability, how can the 
accountability gap between ICL and LAR be overcome, if at all? 
1.2 Limitations 
This thesis will focus on individual criminal accountability for international crimes through 
the ICC-statute. This because the ICC is the only international court with (close to) universal 
jurisdiction for international crimes. Other courts or other forms of accountability available 
for breaches of international law, such as state responsibility, will thus not be covered. 
Neither will questions of accountability in relation to e.g IHL and military law be covered.  
The theoretical basis for the thesis will be the theory of deterrence and retribution, and 
the role that they play in ICL’s theory of ending impunity through accountability. The two 
13 ​Riepl​, “War crimes without criminal accountability?,”. 
14 Ford, “CCW remarks.”, 1. 
15 “Autonomous weapon systems, technical, military, legal and humanitarian aspects”,  ​International Committee 
of the Red Cross ​, 2014, 47. 
https://www.icrc.org/en/document/report-icrc-meeting-autonomous-weapon-systems-26-28-march-2014  
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 theories were chosen as they are well known and widespread theories for justification of 
criminal accountability and has been used by the ICC in e.g. the ICTY (International 
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia).   16
Since the thesis has an ICL perspective, the problems LAR cause IHL and 
International Human Rights Law (IHRL) will not be covered, as those are outside the scope 
of the thesis. It is however not possible to completely overlook IHL in relation to ICL, as it is 
breaches of IHL that is the base to ICL-accountability.  Hence will IHL be mentioned when 17
necessary to understand how IHL and ICL work together.  
The technology used as references for the accountability gap will be LAR. This 
because LAR was the first type of autonomous weapon encountered in the research process 
and because countries such as the United States of America, China, Israel, South Korea, 
Russia and the United Kingdom already have autonomous weapons in use and are continuing 
to develop them into what in future could be LAR.  LAR is therefore the most interesting 18
technology to look at in relation to the accountability gap and ICL, as it is developing rapidly. 
Within the field of LAR you will also encounter the acronyms LAWS and AWS.  The main 19
focus in the thesis is not to distinguish between LAR, LAWS and AWS in relation to the 
accountability gap, but rather focus on what they have in common which is the ability to 
conduct criminal acts without human control.  
1.3 Material and method 
1.3.1 Introduction 
Three different methods will be used in this thesis. The first is a literature review to collect 
the material for the thesis. The material collected will then be used to to do a description of 
16 Criminal accountability can be argued to have other and/or more theoretical grounds of justification than these 
e.g. rehabilitation, vindication, reconciliation, education etc. According to Cryer most criminal systems builds 
upon a mixture of a teleological and deontological perspective. Robert Cryer et al, ​An Introduction to 
International Criminal Law and Procedure​, 3rd​ ​edition​,​ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 30.  
17 Rebecca Crootof, “War Torts: Accountability for autonomous weapons”, ​University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review​, 164:6, 2016, 1361. 
18 “Retaining human control of weapons systems,​ ​Briefing Note for the Convention on Conventional Weapons 
Group of Governmental Experts meeting on lethal autonomous weapons systems”, ​Campaign to stop killer 
robots ​, 2018, 1. 
https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/KRC_Briefing_CCWApr2018.pdf  
19 ​International Committee of the Red Cross ​, “Autonomous weapon systems, technical, military, legal and 
humanitarian aspects”, 5.  
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 the accountability gap. Description is therefore the second method.  The description will be 20
used to show what and where the accountability gap between LAR and ICL is. The third 
method is to use ICL’s goal of ending impunity through accountability and the theory of 
deterrence and retribution as a tool for interpretation and assessment of the proposed action to 
overcome the accountability gap from the ICL-perspective.  
1.3.2 Material 
In the literature review the material from the the most relevant sources and debates in the 
field have been collected. A literature review has the benefit of it being possible to including 
many perspectives and opinions and through that achieve a broad and well-established picture 
of the problem at hand. Since this thesis aims at describing and assessing, a literature review 
is the best way of collecting the material as it needs to be diverse. The risk of using a 
literature review is that the sources chosen shows a biased or unfair picture. Since the choice 
of what to include in the literature review is done by the author, the author needs to be 
transparent in how the material has been collected in order for it to be legitimate.  
In the literature review, the most central and relevant work about LAR has been 
gathered. These are mostly found within the IHL-field and its leading journals for 
international law, as well as blogs and forums, such as e.g ICRC (International Committee of 
the Red Cross) , HRW (Human Rights Watch) and CCW (Convention on Prohibitions or 
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects). As the material has been collected, 
the references and recommendation for further reading has been used as the basis for 
widening the scope of material.  
The starting point for the gathering of the material for the description of the 
accountability gap was taken from the HRW’s-articles “Mind the gap: The lack of 
accountability for killer robots”  and “Losing humanity: The case against killer robots” . 21 22
The reason for starting there is that both articles are the most easily accessed articles about 
the accountability gap and LAR, but thorough enough to give a good first insight into the 
subject and problem. With the help of the references in those articles and the book 
20 Anne Orford, “In praise of description​”, Leiden Journal of International Law​. 25, (2012). 
21 ​Human Rights Watch​, “Mind the Gap:”. 
22 Human Rights Watch, International Human Rights Clinic. “Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer 
Robots”​. Human Rights Watch​, 2012. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/arms1112_ForUpload.pdf  
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 “Autonomous weapons system: Law, Ethics and Policy” the material will be widened with 
relevant and appropriate sources to show a variety of different opinions and statements 
regarding the accountability gap.  
The ICRC’s blog will also be used. The posts published on the blog are rather short, 
but written by well renowned scholars and include sources for more relevant material, which 
will be also used.  
The CCW’s webpage also provide useful material for this thesis. On their webpage at 
United Nations Office of Geneva, you can find the material which is used as the basis for 
their discussion about LAWS. Most of the papers provided unfortunately lacks references and 
can therefore be questioned as academic sources. However, since the statements and 
presentations provided are used in the work of the CCW expert group and are written by well 
renowned scholars and publicly distributed by the CCW, they are controlled to an extent 
which makes it acceptable to use them in academic work. They will therefore be included in 
the thesis.  
The material used for the discussion is collected in the same way as for the 
description, with a larger focus towards the material from the CCW, an article by Robert 
Sparrow and the book “Autonomous weapons system: Law, Ethics and Policy” as they 
include the most interesting aspects and debates for the discussion.  
The material used for the background of ICL will be taken from books about 
international criminal law. A few of those books are old, which can be problematic as the 
field of LAR is technological and therefore under rapid and constant development. It has to 
be empathized that these older sources will only be used for the parts of the background that 
are not part of this fast changing field, such as the presentations of the forms of accountability 
in the ICC-statute. These facts are the same as when the ICC-statute was created in 1998, and 
hence is there no need to exclude these older sources solely based on age when they are used 
as described.  
There are three other sources that are older but frequently used. These are a book by 
Armin Krishnan, an article by Robert Sparrow and an article by Andreas Matthias. Matthias 
article is used for a historical aspect, and is therefore needed. Krishnan’s book offers 
interesting points for my discussion which still hold validity for today, and is still used for 
references in new scholars work. Sparrow’s article is a cornerstone of the debates about LAR 
and accountability with many scholars still referring to his work. Rather than using a later 
11 
 scholar’s reinterpretation of Krishnans, Sparrows and Matthias words, reference to their 
original publications will be done.  
The material for the theory is found in Robert Cryer’s book about International 
criminal law and HRW’s article “Mind the gap: The lack of accountability for killer robots”. 
Their description of the theory of deterrence and retribution and how those relate to ICL and 
the goals in the ICC-statute’s preamble are those that will work best with my choice of 
perspective.  
1.3.3 Method 
The aim of the first research question is to do a description of the grounds of accountability in 
the ICC-statute in relation to LAR. Since the question wants to show where the accountability 
gap is and what it looks like, a description is the best way to do so. Anne Orford has used 
description as a method in her writing when conducting researching in an area where there is 
a gap or two strong sides of arguments that are to be presented. She argues with the help of 
the philosopher Michel Foucault that description as a legal method can be successfully used 
when not aiming at unraveling something hidden but rather show something that is already 
visible.  A description also reduces the risk of misinterpretation or misunderstanding as it 23
makes sure that the reader correctly understands the background to later arguments.  
Description is a great method if you have trouble establishing or understanding an 
area or a concept. As for the accountability gap, it is a concept that is in theory rather easy to 
understand. However, to understand it in more precise terms and in relation to each form of 
accountability in the ICC is more challenging. It is therefore beneficial for the reader’s 
understanding of the accountability gap to do a description of it, even though it has been done 
before by other scholars.  
The procedure that needs to be undertaken to conduct a descriptive method is to map 
out as many connections and relations between the relevant elements as possible.  Critiques 24
mean that only using description as a method is shallow, static and not analysing. Orford 
together with Foucault argues against this and means that it is only when you understand the 
relations and connections between the elements that it is later possible to understand the 
actions needed to be taken for one element to change.  This is a highly relevant argument for 25
23 Orford, “In praise “, 609, 612, 617. 
24 ibid., 618. 
25 ibid. 
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 this thesis as the discussion will focus on potential changes to the ruling doctrine. 
This brings us to the second research question of the thesis, which is the basis for the 
discussion. The aim for the second research question is to connect the the theory of 
deterrence and retribution found in the ICC goal of ending impunity by accountability with 
the the proposed actions to overcome the accountability gap.  
The starting point of the discussion is taken in a presentation of other scholars 
relevant arguments and discussions of how to overcome the accountability gap. This to gain a 
basis of what the proposed actions are and how they seek to overcome the accountability gap. 
Using the theory of deterrence and retribution as a tool, the proposed actions will be assessed 
to tell if it is an action that will be beneficial or not to take in regards of the goal to end 
impunity. The ICL-perspective that most scholars overlook have then been intervened in the 
assessment. The proposed action assed in the discussion will be the possibility of extending 
mens rea (the mental element) and natural person to include LAR, meaningful human control, 
banning of LAR, analogy to the regulation of child soldiers and strict liability. The aim of the 
discussion is not to find the ultimate and best solution to combat the accountability gap from 
an holistic perspective, but to discuss the proposed actions in relation to what might work 
best for ICL.  
1.4 Theory 
1.4.1 What is an accountability gap? 
HRW states that the existing mechanisms for legal accountability are not well suited and 
inadequate to prosecute the harm LAR could cause, and therefore there is a risk of an 
accountability gap between LAR and ICL.  What LAR does, together with all other AWS, is 26
that it challenges the presumption that a criminal act only can be conducted by a human. The 
lack of a human acting with intention in LAR means that no one can be held accountable.  27
This is the accountability gap. 
26 ​Human Rights Watch, ​“Mind the Gap:”, 2.  
27 Crootof “War torts,”, 1366. 
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 Amongst the first to write about the challenge between intelligent machines and 
accountability was a scholar named Perry 6. He says that difficulty will arise in imputing 
responsibility on intelligent machines, and that machines will never have moral agency.   28
Andreas Matthias was one of the first scholars to introduce the term responsibility gap 
(now referred to as accountability gap). He identified that “agents can only be responsible if 
he knows the particular facts surrounding his action, and if he is able to freely form a decision 
to act, and to select one of suitable set of available actions based on these facts”.  He 29
concluded that control is a necessity for responsibility, and thus the operator of the machine 
will have ​less responsibility over it the less control he or she has ​.   30
Machine learning and AI are both able to alter the production process of the machine 
during the operation, without the intervention of a human. For the use of these type of 
technology neither developer, operator, programmer or manufacturer could be held 
accountable if no individual fault could be identified.  As machine learning have increased, 31
and AI have developed, the traditional ways of ascribing responsibility are not compatible 
with this technology. This since no one has enough control over the machine to be found 
accountable.  This is what Matthias meant is the accountability gap. An accountability gap 32
could therefore also be described as the space that opens up between two things that are 
supposed to overlap. 
A relevant concept close to the accountability gap is the term ‘impunity gap’. At first 
sight, the two concepts might seem alike, and it can be questioned if there is a difference 
between them and what that difference then would be.  
One can start with looking at the different meaning of the words. “Impunity” means 
the exemption of a punishment and lack of punishment for wrongful actions.  33
“Accountability” can be described with the synonym “responsibility” and described as the 
28 Perri, 6. “Ethics, regulation and the new artificial intelligence, part II: autonomy and liability” ​Information, 
Communication & Society​, 4:3 2001, 426. (Perri, 6 was known as David Ashwood before 1983). 
Thompson, Chengeta. “Accountability Gap: Autonomous Weapon Systems and Modes of Responsibility in 
International Law”​. ​Denver Journal of international Law and Policy, 2016, 9. 
29Andreas Matthias, “The responsibility gap: ascribing responsibility for the actions of learning automata”. 
Ethics and Information Technology​, 2004 issue 3, p. 175. 
30 ibid., 175-176. 
31 ibid., 177. 
32 ibid., 177. 
33 “Definition of impunity”, ​Oxford Living Dictionaries.​ Accessed 2018. 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/impunity  
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 factor or condition of being accountable or responsible.  While this still seems like the same 34
concept there is a difference between “accountability” and “responsibility”, especially within 
the field of law. Accountable is in law used to describe the one that is responsible. However, 
one can be responsible without being accountable, if they for example do not fulfill the 
requirements for accountability (e.g. minors). It is hard to draw a clear distinction between 
the two, but it is important to take into consideration that there is a difference. The morale is 
that the difference makes it important to distinguish between them when using either.  
When talking about “impunity gap” in the context of international crimes, what is 
meant is an accountability gap but on a different “level”. The term impunity gap is used to 
describe a scenario where some sort of atrocity has occurred, but there is either no will or 
way to punish it domestically and the ICC has no jurisdiction to intervene.  An 35
accountability gap (as described in this thesis) is a space that opens up between two things 
that are, in theory, supposed to overlap. The two concepts therefore deals with the same 
problem, but in different ways and on different “levels”. It is however not possible to draw a 
precise line where the accountability gap ends and the impunity gap begins. From this point 
of view, the difference between the two lays in the approach to them, where impunity gap is 
more related to the will and possibility of states and ICC to prosecute crimes that has 
occured, an accountability gap is the issue of technically holding someone accountable for a 
certain action when it has been established that someone has jurisdiction.  
1.4.2 Deterrence and retribution in ICL’s goal of ending impunity 
The goal of ending impunity is established in the preamble of the ICC. The preamble reads 
“Determined ​ ​to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to 
contribute to the prevention of such crimes”.  ​The goal to end impunity for the most serious 36
crimes to the international community is based in the wish for international crimes to not be 
left unpunished, as this might encourage future crimes and impede rebuilding of societies 
post-conflict. By establishing individual accountability though ICL for some of mankind's 
worst crimes (war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and aggression), it is believed 
34 “Definition of accountability”, ​Oxford Living Dictionaries.​ Accessed 2018. 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/accountability  
35 Nicolas Michel, Katherine Del Mar, “Transitional justice” in ​The Oxford Handbook of International Law in 
Armed Conflict,​ Edited by Andrew Clapham and Paola Gaeta (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014), 875. 
36 ICC statute preamble, subsection 5. 
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 that future crimes will be deterred and that the victims are given some retribution for their 
suffering.   37
Criminal accountability can in general be said to have two main goals. These are to 
deter and punish harmful and unlawful acts and achieve some recognition for the victims. 
Criminal law wants to, by criminalizing and punishing certain acts, create hurdles that makes 
it morally harder for people to violate them.  Two of the main theories for doing this is 38
deterrence and retribution.   39
It is generally believed within criminal law that if criminal acts are punished and 
criminals held accountable, the perpetrators or other people are less likely to repeat them. 
This is is the theory of deterrence. In the ICC-statute, the theory of deterrence is used as a 
theoretical basis for the ICC’s goal of ending impunity.   40
Deterrence can be explained as a theory for justification of punishments. Jeremy 
Bentham is the most known philosopher behind the theory of deterrence. The prevention of 
future crimes for both the perpetrator and the population as a whole is one of the cornerstones 
in this theory.  The basis of deterrence is found in utilitarianism, where the benefits for 41
society as a whole trump the benefits of the individual. This means that there is nothing that 
prevents extremely heavy punishments and punishments of innocent if it benefits society as a 
whole. Cryer exemplifies the possibility of punishing a family member of the perpetrator 
might be the best deterrence of them all, even though this is not considered morally 
defensible in a civil society.  For deterrence to reach its full potential, the perpetrators need 42
to know in advance what is prohibited so that an assessment of the consequences can be done 
before he or she acts.  Deterrence focuses a future oriented perspective, and therefore takes 43
into consideration how an act could affect in the long run.  44
Critiques against the theory of deterrence mean that the lack of convictions in ICL 
(very few people have been convicted for international crimes) undermine the whole meaning 
of deterrence in ICL. Some argues however that as long as a culture of accountability is 
37 Jens David Ohlin, “Justice after war” in ​Oxford Handbooks on Ethics of War ​, edited by ​Seth Lazar and Helen 
Frowe ​(Oxford: Oxford University press, 2015), 519-520. 
38 Crootof, “War Torts,”, 1362. 
39 Cryer et al., “An introduction”, 30. There are plenty of other theoretical grounds for justification criminal 
accountability found in ICL, e.g.​ ​rehabilitation, vindication, reconciliation, education etc. 
40 ibid., 33.  
41 ibid., 32. 
42 ibid., 32. 
43 Human Rights Watch, “Mind the Gap:”,14.  
44 Cryer et al, ​An Introduction​, 30. 
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 created around the international crimes, it will eventually lead to deterrence.  Considering 45
the special nature of international crimes, there is a risk that deterrence won’t work properly. 
This because the wider public where the theory is to apply needs to be part of the same moral 
community for it to gain full effect. This sort of community may, and most likely do, exist on 
domestic and maybe regional level. It can however be questioned if it exists it the 
international sphere.  46
            The second goal of criminal accountability is to provide retribution for victims.  This 47
is done through ​individual​ accountability.  Individual accountability is one component in 48
restoring victims dignity, since it establishes victims rights after they have been violated.  49
The aim is that victims should, through individual accountability in e.g. ICL, feel that 
someone is being condemned and punished for the harm that has been caused them. It is also 
believed that by holding perpetrators individually accountable, collective blame can be 
avoided. To avoid collective blame is a crucial step towards rebuilding a functioning society 
after a conflict.   50
The aspect of retribution is not a new theory within criminal law and has its basis in 
the philosopher Immanuel Kant. Retribution focuses on punishing those who have broken a 
social norm. It does not take into consideration future benefits of prosecution like deterrence 
does, it only focuses on the fact that the offender deserves a punishment.  Someone who is 51
true to the retributionist theory believes the utility of prosecutions is irrelevant as the goal of 
the punishment is to give the the perpetrator what they rightly deserve. The retributive theory 
therefore focuses on a deontological aspect, a backwards perspective.  For a retributionist, 52
the most important thing is what is practical and morally necessary.  53
The theory of retribution has been considered a particularly good fit for ICL. ICL 
does not take into account the same rationales as domestic criminal law does, and therefore 
holding perpetrators accountable for their actions regardless of other parameters could be an 
45 Cryer et al, ​An Introduction​, 34. 
46 S. Nouwen, “ International criminal law: theory all over the place” in​ Oxford Handbook on International 
Theory​, eds. Anne Orford and Florian Hoffmann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 752-753. 
47 ​Human Rights Watch, ​“Mind the Gap:”, 13.  
48 ibid., 14.  
49 Crootof, “War torts,”, 1363. 
50 ​Human Rights Watch, “ ​Mind the Gap:”, 14-15.  
51 Ohlin, “Justice after war”, 520. 
52 Cryer et al, ​An Introduction​,​ ​30. 
53 ibid, 2. 
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 attractive method.  However, the line between retribution and vengeance is thin, and 54
therefore the modern day approaches to retribution are very careful to distinguish between the 
two.  55
One important aspect of retribution is the role it plays as a reflection of the demand 
for  accountability that victims have. Retribution holds a requirement of proportionality 
between the action and the punishment, something that is used in most domestic criminal 
systems throughout the world.  The question of proportionality is however an issue for ICL 56
as the atrocities that are considered international crimes may not have a proportional 
punishment. 
The theory about retribution is not without its problems. Critiques say for example 
that retribution demands punishments without regard to the cost, that it sets a high standard 
for disadvantaged groups and societies and that it requires a punishment even where there is 
no point of it.  57
To summarise, the ICL goal of ending impunity uses the theory of deterrence and 
retribution as justification for criminal accountability. The goal of ending impunity thus 
entails a wish to deter future crimes through criminal accountability, but the accountability 
needs to benefit the future society. It also entails a wish for victims to find retribution through 
the individual accountability ICL offers, and this doesn’t take into consideration future 
benefits of the punishment but rather focuses on the victims right to recognition for their 
suffering. This is the theoretical standpoint of the thesis.  
1.5 Outline 
The thesis will start with a background. The background consists of a closer look and 
presentation of what LAR is by describing its abilities, definition and controversy and 
attraction. After this, it is touched upon how criminal accountability is created in the 
ICC-statute. This is done through establishing which the most important provisions and what 
the active and mental element means for accountability. This is followed up with a 
presentation of what each of the ground of accountability in the ICC-statute entialis. 
54 Cryer et al, ​An Introduction​,​ ​30. 
55 ibid., 31. 
56 ibid., 31.  
57 ibid, 32. 
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 The next part is the description where Orfords method of description is applied. This 
section seeks to map out what the accountability gap looks like between LAR and ICL and 
where it is. This section will describe how accountability in ICL will look like for LAR as its 
own entity, for operators of LAR, for commanders over LAR and for manufacturers, 
developers and producers of LAR.  
The discussion is next and will focus on how the accountability gap can be overcome. 
The discussion will firstly present the proposed action to overcome the accountability gap 
and then assess the action from the theoretical perspective of deterrence and retribution, 
trying to see if the action is compatible with these two perspectives found in the goal of 
ending impunity.  
The first proposed action discussed will be the possibility of extending mens rea and 
natural persons to include LAR as its own entity. This action means that the accountability 
gap would be overcome as the LAR themselves could be held accountable.  
The next proposed action discussed is meaningful human control. A definition would 
make sure that no weapons that are beyond human control are used and/or developed and this 
would help to overcome the accountability gap.  
After that, the possibility of overcoming the accountability gap though a ban of LAR 
is discussed. This action would result in that the future use of LAR is prohibited, and the 
accountability gap would be overcome.  
The possibility of overcoming the accountability gap through an analogy to the 
regulation of child soldiers is then discussed. This action propose that the accountability gap 
could be overcome if LAR uses the same sort of accountability scheme as is used in for the 
recruitment and use of child soldiers. This would mean that accountability could be 
established for the LAR, and the accountability gap would be overcome. 
Lastly, the possibility of applying strict liability on the use of LAR is covered. This 
action proposes that the accountability gap could be overcome if strict liability is used for all 
types of use of LAR. 
In the conclusion, it is concluded that the accountability gap between LAR and ICL 
exists in all form of accountability available in the ICC-statute, as no accountability can be 
guaranteed for any party. It is also concluded that the both natural persons and mens rea need 
human subjects to work as intended from a retributive and deterrent perspective. This means 
that the actions to overcome the accountability gap need to focuses on finding this human 
19 
 subject. Exactly how this is done is of lesser importance to ICL, but from a deterrent and 
retributive perspective, banning of LAR would be the best option.  
 
2. Background 
2.1 What is LAR? 
2.1.1 Introduction 
AWS technology exists in a variety of forms, from systems with very little autonomy to 
systems with full autonomy. The systems that operates under close observation and control of 
humans are usually only called “autonomous systems” while the systems that have no or 
close to no human control are called “fully autonomous systems”.  A low level of autonomy 58
can for example consist of the ability to return to base by its own account, while fully 
autonomous systems means that the robots can both identity and kill its victim on its own.  59
Christof Heyns says that “full autonomy exists where human no longer exercise meaningful 
human control”.  A LAR would be a system that is fully autonomous.   60 61
A system where the human doesn’t have meaningful control is also expressed as a 
system where the human is “out of the loop”. The term refers to the human which is not 
involved in the line of decision making in a fully autonomous system. In contrast to “out of 
the loop”, a system that is “in the loop” can only select and engage targets with human 
command. The term “on the loop” is also sometimes used and refers to systems that can 
select and engage targets under human supervision and where the human can override the 
robots decisions.  Previous remote controlled drones that have been used have had the 62
human “in the loop” or “on the loop”.   63
As a LAR is autonomous rather than automatic, they can alter their pre-programmed 
schedule by learning from their own mistakes  It is not coherent in the literature if the 64
58 Heyns, “Autonomous weapons systems: living a dignified life and dying a dignified death.”, 6. 
59 ​Human Rights Watch​, “Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots” 6. 
60 Heyns, “Autonomous weapons systems: living a dignified life and dying a dignified death.” , 14. 
61 Human Rights Watch, ​“Mind the Gap:”, 6. 
62 ​ibid., 6. 
63 ​ibid., 6.  
64 ​Robert Sparrow “Killer Robots.” ​Journal of Applied Philosophy​, 24 (2007)​, 65. 
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 launch of LAR is decided by humans or not. Some argue that each operation has to be 
activated by an operator, while other argues that once it is activated all operations are 
undertaken by the LAR on its own.  65
2.1.2 Definition 
One of the leading definitions of autonomous systems was set by the The United States of 
America’s Department of Defense in 2013 and states an autonomous system as “once 
activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator. 
This includes human-supervised AWS that are designed to allow human operators to override 
operation of the weapon system, but can select and engage targets without further human 
input after activation.”.  The ICRC has defined autonomous systems in a very similar way.  66 67
The UK’s Ministry of Defense defines autonomous systems as “capable of 
understanding higher level intent and direction […] such a system is able to take appropriate 
action to bring about a desired state. It is capable of deciding a course of action, from a 
number of alternatives, without depending on human oversight and control, although these 
may still be present. Although the overall activity of an autonomous unmanned aircraft will 
be predictable, individual actions may not be.”.   68
These two definitions, while not universally recognised, give insight into what a 
system that is autonomous can do. A LAR, which is a ​fully​ autonomous system, can therefore 
be included in this, even though the definition is not directly aimed at it.   69
 
65 Hin-Yan Liu, “Refining responsibility: differentiating two types of responsibility issues raised by autonomous 
weapons systems”  in ​Autonomous Weapons Systems Law, Ethics and Policy, ​eds. Nehal Bhuta et. al. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 328. 
66 Rebecca Crootof, “The Killer Robots are Here: Legal and Policy Implications.”​ Cardozo Law Review,​ 36 
(2015), 1850. 
67 “Any weapon system with autonomy in its critical functions. That is, a weapon system that can select (i.e. 
search for or detect, identify, track, select) and attack (i.e. use force against, neutralize, damage or destroy) 
targets without human intervention.”.  
“Views of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on autonomous weapon system.”, ​Convention 
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), 
2016.  
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/86748714E19ABC52C1257 
F930057E50B/$file/2016_LAWS+MX_Towardaworkingdefinition_Statements_ICRC.pdf 
68 Crootof, “The Killer Robots,”​, ​1853. 
69 Pablo Kalmanovitz, “Judgement liability and the risks of reckless warfare” in ​Autonomous Weapons Systems 
Law, Ethics and Policy, ​eds. Nehal Bhuta et. al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 155. 
21 
 2.1.3 Controversy and attraction 
LAR and the potential and future use of it has sparked controversy around the world. ​The 
Future of life Institute ​, whose purpose is research that safeguards life and develop optimistic 
visions of the future for humanity and technology , promoted in an open letter that while the 70
use of AI has potential to greatly benefit humanity, the use of autonomous weapons that are 
“beyond human control” should be banned. The letter was signed by thousands of scholars 
and influental company leaders working with AI and robotics. They described it as possible 
within years, not decades to build robots like LAR and that they would pose a great threat to 
humanity.   71
Despite the controversy surrounding LAR, it is easy to see why they are attractive for 
military purposes. Autonomous weapons have the ability to protect personnel and equipment 
in war from harm.  Autonomous system can also process much more information in a shorter 72
period of time than a human could. It has also been argued that autonomous systems could be 
used to make sure that no one is e.g wrongfully hit, killed or harmed, and thus enforce the 
principles and rules of IHL and IHRL better than humans could and through that lower the 
risk of e.g. war crimes.  On the contrary it has also been argued that autonomous weapons 73
“depersonalize” the acts in war by taking the fear away from the battlefield. On the other 
hand, by taking the fear away it has been argued that a robot would not respond to the feeling 
of being afraid or threatened and therefore abstain from acting until it is allowed by law.   74
2.3 Criminal accountability under ICL 
The introduction of ICL developed a whole new take on accountability within the field of 
international law. Before ICL, international law could only imply accountability upon states 
when they violated an international treaty or customary rule. This way of implying 
accountability is the overall and general approach in international law. With the introduction 
of ICL came the possibility of ​individual​ accountability for specific ​international​ crimes.  75
70 ​Future of Life institute, ​“Autonomous weapons: An Open Letter,”. 
71 ibid. 
72 Heyns, ​“ ​Autonomous weapons systems: living a dignified life and dying a dignified death”,, 6-7. 
73 ibid., 6-7. Crootof “War Torts:”,  1351. 
74 Heyns, ​“ ​Autonomous weapons systems: living a dignified life and dying a dignified death”​, ​6-7. 
75 Crootof “War torts,”, 1351. 
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 While individual accountability for international crimes has an important historical basis in 
e.g the Nürmeberg and Tokyo Trials in the aftermath of the second world war , ICL evolved 76
significantly in the 1990’s with the establishment of the ICC-statute and can be argued to 
have become its own body of law at that time.   77
Article 25 and 30 in the ICC-statute is the most important provisions for this thesis. 
Article 25 in the ICC-statute establishes the ground of criminal accountability and provides in 
its sub-paragraphs what acts ICC has jurisdiction over.  It is important to note that article 78
25.1 establishes that the ICC only has jurisdiction over ​natural persons ​. This means that legal 
persons, corporation, states etc. don’t fall within the jurisdiction of the Court as subjects.   79
Article 30 establishes that both an objective/active element (actus reus) and a 
subjective/mental element (mens rea) needs to be established for there to be individual 
criminal accountability.  
Article 25.3 provides the modes of participation, the active elements, that are within 
the jurisdiction of the Court. The requirement of an active element means that the offender 
must have conducted something that is criminally punishable according to the statute. The 
mental element means that the offender must have intent and knowledge. It is not only intent 
that is considered mens rea, also omission, recklessness, culpable negligence, and inadvertent 
negligence.   80
All the crimes prosecuted within ICC are war crimes, genocide, crimes against 
humanity and aggression.  War crimes originate from IHL and aims at protecting victims of 81
armed conflicts.  Genocide and crimes against humanity derives from IHRL, and has its 82
basis in the wish for the atrocities of the second world war to never be repeated again.  83
Aggression has its basis in a wish to protect state sovereignty.  Since ICL is influenced by 84
76 Cryer et al, ​An Introduction​, 115. 
77 ibid., 3. 
78 Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, ​International Criminal Law​. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 233. 
79 Heyns, ​“ ​Autonomous weapons systems: living a dignified life and dying a dignified death”, 13.  
Roberta Arnold, ”Criminal responsibility for IHL breaches by (the use) of LAWS”, Informal meeting of experts 
on LAWS. February 13, 2016. 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/1BBDA5971E56E3CBC1257F9500279D9C/$file/2016
_LAWS+MX+Presentations_ChallengestoIHL_Roberta+Arnold.pdf 
80 Antonio Cassese, ​International Criminal Law​. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 161 
81 The ICC-statute article 5. Arnold, ”Criminal responsibility for IHL breaches,”. 
82 Cryer et al, ​An Introduction​, 15. 
83 ibid., 13. 
84 ibid., 307. 
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 other areas of law, their point of view and standards have to be carefully interpreted before 
taken into ICL as ICL has its own distinct principles of interpretation.   85
2.4 Forms of accountability in the ICC-statute 
2.4.1 Direct acts 
2.4.1.1 Perpetration and co-perpetration 
The perhaps most well established principles of accountability in international law are those 
for direct acts.  The direct acts are specified in the ICC-statute article 25.3 (a) and (b) and is 86
thus the acts of perpetration, co-perpetration, ordering, soliciting and inducing.   87
Perpetration is the form of accountability used for the person that has physically 
conducted a crime and carried out all elements of the offence.  Like all forms of 88
accountability, perpetration needs both actus reus and mens rea. The actus reus for 
perpetration is the unlawful act, such as killing someone with a gun, and the mens rea is the 
intent to do so.   89
Co-perpetration was defined in the ​Lubanga​ case in the ICC as to when all the 
coordinated individual contributions by a plurality of persons leads to the realisation of all the 
objective elements of a crime. Any person that has contributed can therefore be held 
accountable for the contribution of all the others.  The actus reus is thus that it exists a 90
common plan and all perpetrators must have the same criminal intent as the one conducting 
the crime to fulfill the mens rea.   91
2.4.2 Indirect acts 
Indirect act are specified in the ICC-statute article 25.3 (c) and (d) and is thus the acts of 
aiding, abetting or otherwise contributing in any way to a crime or the attempt of a crime.  92
Indirect acts also include the doctrine of command responsibility.  
85 Cryer et al, ​An Introduction​, 16. 
86 Kittichaisaree, ​International Criminal Law​, 234. 
87 ibid., 234. 
88 ibid., 355. 
89 ibid., 364. 
90 Kittichaisaree, ​International Criminal Law​, 364. 
91 Chengeta, “Accountability Gap,”​,​ 20.  
92 Kittichaisaree, ​International Criminal Law, ​234. 
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 2.4.2.1 Aiding, abetting, planning and preparation 
Aiding means to help by assisting, while abetting means to be involved by facilitating the 
commission of a criminal act by being e.g. sympathetic or encouraging.  This form of 93
accountability is a powerful tool for the ICC since it can create accountability for people that 
are not directly involved in the crime but nevertheless important.  94
The actus reus of aiding and abetting requires that someone practically assists, 
encourages or gives moral support to someone that has ​substantial effect ​ on the perpetration 
of the crime.  It is therefore two requirements to fulfill the actus reus of aiding and abetting, 95
act of participation and that this act has substantial effect on the crime.   What the person 96
aiding or abetting does might be lawful, but paired together with the perpetrators unlawful 
conduct it becomes a criminal act. It is not necessary that the one aiding or abetting has 
helped in the form of providing material or physical help. It is enough to “silently agree” to 
what is being done, as long as there is intent of the effect.   97
The person aiding or abetting also needs to have knowledge that their act will assist 
the crime in order to fulfill mens rea.  It is not necessary to share the intent with the criminal 98
offender.  Aiding and abetting has been described as a form of liability that can fill gaps in 99
the liability scheme.  100
2.4.2.2 Command responsibility 
Command responsibility is a mix between both direct and indirect accountability. A 
commander can be held directly accountable for not intervening and therefore indirectly 
accountable for the crime their subordinate has committed.  101
It was in the ​Delalić ​case of the ICTY that the premises of commander accountability 
was established. It was concluded that a commander can be responsible for their subordinates 
93 Kittichaisaree, ​International Criminal Law,​., 241. 
94 Cassese, Antonio. ​International Criminal Law: Cases and Commentary​. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 381. 
95 Kittichaisaree, ​International Criminal Law,​ 241. 
96 ibid.,​ ​243. 
97 ibid., 243. 
98 Cassese, ​International Criminal Law: Cases and Commentary​, 381. 
99 ibid., 381. 
100 ibid., 381. 
101 Jain, Neha, “Autonomous weapons systems: new frameworks for individual responsibility.” in ​Autonomous 
Weapons Systems Law, Ethics and Policy, ​eds. Nehal Bhuta et. al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2016), 310. 
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 crimes if he or she has failed to prevent or punish subordinate for their crimes.  102
Accountability occurs if a commander-subordinate relationship can be established and the 
commander has effective control over his/her subordinate, the superior knew, had reason to 
know or should have known of the subordinate's crimes (this fulfills the mental element) and 
the commander has failed to prevent, control or punish the conduct.  Article 28.1 in the 103
ICC-statute, it is stated that there also needs to be a causal connection between crime and 
commander. The commander therefore needs to have caused the crime by his action (or lack 
of).   104
 
3. Where is the accountability gap and what does it look 
like? 
 
Criminal law has previously faced the difficulty of having subjects causing harm that cannot 
be held accountable for their actions, e.g. minors and people deemed insane.  However, the 105
challenges minors and insane posed are different to the challenges LAR pose. The LAR has 
“no soul to be damned and no body to be kicked”  and therefore, it will be difficult if not 106
impossible create criminal accountability for it in ICL. However, behind the deployment, 
development and use of LAR there are human operators, commanders, developers, 
manufacturers, programmers and producers and the question is if any of these can be held 
accountable.   107
The following sections describes if and map out how each of these persons could be 
held accountable under the forms of accountability available in the ICC-statute. The goal of 
the description is to try to show ​where​ the accountability gap between LAR and ICL is and 
what​ it looks like.  
102 ​Human Rights Watch​, “Mind the Gap:”, 20-21.  
103 Jain, “Autonomous weapons systems: new frameworks,”, 310. 
104 ibid., 310-311. 
105 ibid., 303. 
106 ibid., 303. 
107Jain, “Autonomous weapons systems: new frameworks,”, 303-304. ​Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons (CCW) Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS)​, “Views of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),”,​ ​5.  
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 3.1 Possible forms of accountability for each party 
3.1.1 Criminal accountability for the LAR as its own entity 
Soldiers are customarily accountable for breaches of law on the principle of moral equality of 
soldiers. This means that the responsibility of war is not attributed to the soldiers, but the 
soldiers actions in war are. This because soldiers, as moral agents, are free enough to be held 
accountable for their actions.  You are “free enough” to be considered a moral agent when 108
you exercise your will “free of any determining force”. Autonomy can be described as this 
freedom to act.  Soldiers that are considered moral agents are thus free to make decisions 109
based on their own autonomy as can thus be held accountable for their actions.  
LAR, on the other hand, don’t have this freedom to act and is thus not a moral agent.
 After launching, LAR will have the ability to act without human control since it is a fully 110
autonomous system. LAR will thus be able to kill without human command and cause harm 
that is punishable under the ICC-statute.  LAR can therefore fulfill the actus reus 111
requirement.  
When it comes to mens rea, HRW agues that an autonomous weapon of any kind, 
such as LAR could not possess mens rea. To have mens rea you need to have moral agency 
and independent intentionality, which a robot cannot have.  There are scholars that argues 112
differently and means that LAR could have moral agency, e.g. based on their ability to learn 
from their own mistakes and from being punished and could thus technically be held 
accountable on their own.  Some argue however that the ability of mimicking human 113
intelligence and to act in the same way as moral agent does do not make you a moral agent.  114
It is therefore not possible for LAR to fulfill the requirement of mens rea.  
As stated in the ICC-Statute, only natural persons can be held criminally accountable.
108 Heather Roff, “Killing in War: Responsibility, Liability and Lethal Autonomous Robots”, 6. 
https://www.academia.edu/2606840/Killing_in_War_Responsibility_Liability_and_Lethal_Autonomous_Robot
s  
109 ibid., 3.  
110 ibid., 6.  
111 Human Rights Watch​, “Mind the Gap:”, 19-20. 
112 Arnold, ”Criminal responsibility for IHL breaches,”.​ Human Rights Watch, “ ​Mind the Gap:”, 17-18.  
113 Thomas Hellström, “On the moral responsibility of military robots” ​Ethics and Information Technology, 
15:99​ ​(2013): ​105. 
114 Roff, “Killing in War”, 7.  
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  A robot is not a natural person, therefore it cannot bear criminal accountability under the 115
ICC-statute. The provision of natural persons in the ICC-statute has through case law been 
widened to include organisations, but LAR as a robotic entity couldn’t be considered an 
organisation.   116
Therefore, LAR on its own could not be held accountable under the ICC-statute. It 
can fulfill the active element of the crime, but lacks the ability to have mens rea and is neither 
a natural person.  
3.1.2 Criminal accountability for the operator 
Technically, a operator who deployed LAR with the direct intention to wilfully kill civilians 
and precise knowledge of what LAR would do, could be held responsible for that as an act of 
perpetration.  However, as LAR is unpredictable, it can be questioned if an operator could 117
have enough precise knowledge of an artificially intelligent robot to fulfill the requirement of 
actus reus and mens rea. The level of unforeseeability and unpredictability in systems like 
LAR will make it difficult, if not impossible, for the operator to know what the LAR will do 
once activated.   Because of the unforeseeability in LAR, and that the operator has not 118
ordered or has control over the action taken by LAR it would be impossible and unreasonable 
for the operator to be held accountable for its actions.   119
A practical aspect of direct accountability is that the launch of a LAR involves more 
than one person. The process of proving which party is responsible for the order that caused 
the death or injury is very difficult even if the question of intent is fulfilled.   In a situation 120
like this, it would be easy and not unlikely for the operator to escape accountability based on 
this.  Accountability for the operator of LAR can therefore not be guaranteed.  121
115 ICC-statute, article 25.1. 
116 Jain, “Autonomous weapons systems: new frameworks,”, 309-310.  
117 Davidson, “A Legal perspective”, 17. ​Human Rights Watch,​ “Mind the Gap:” 20. 
118 Human Rights Watch,​ “Mind the Gap:”, 19-20.  
119 Crootof, “War torts”, 1376. 
120 ​Human Rights Watch, ​“Mind the Gap:”, 19-20.  
121 International Committee of the Red Cross,​ “Autonomous weapon systems, technical, military, legal and 
humanitarian aspects”, 46.  
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 3.1.3 Criminal accountability for the producer, manufacturer and developers 
Crootof and UNODA (United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs) argues that if a 
programmer ​willfully ​ programmed an autonomous weapon to commit criminal acts, he or she 
could be charged for that as an act of perpetration.   122
If producers, manufacturers and developers of LAR shall be accountable for 
perpetration, they must be aware of that the particular LAR they’ve constructed was going to 
be used to commit a specific crime to fulfill the actus reus requirement. A programmer, 
manufacturers or developer must then also have made the choice of providing this system 
with this prior knowledge and share the same intent as the operator of the system to fulfill the 
requirement of mens rea.  The ICRC recognizes that it might be hard for the programmer to 123
know in which scenarios their programs or products later will be used, but argues in the same 
way as Crootof and UNODA and means that a programmer that has willfully programmed to 
commit crimes could technically be held criminally accountable.   124
It is argued that since responsibility for a crime does not arise from sole individual 
involvement in it, producers and developers should be excluded from accountability based on 
that.  It is said that the role manufacturers, programmers and developers plays is so remote 125
from the actual crime, both in time and space, and together with the unforeseeability of LAR 
makes it difficult to hold them accountable for co-perpetration  as it can be questioned if the 126
causal link-requirement is fulfilled. Direct accountability would therefore likely not apply for 
the manufacturer, producers or developers of LAR.  Accountability for perpetration for 127
programmer, manufacturers or developer is therefore not something that can be guaranteed.  
Aiding and abetting are the forms of accountability that are perhaps the most relevant 
for manufacturers, developers and producers of LAR. Thompson Chengeta argues that it is 
technically possible for manufacturers, producers and developers to be charged for aiding and 
122 Crootof, “War torts,” 1367-1377. Davidson “A Legal perspective”,​ ​17. 
123 Chengeta, “Accountability Gap,”​,​ 20.  
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127 International Committee of the Red Cross,​ “Autonomous weapon systems, technical, military, legal and 
humanitarian aspects”, 47.  
“Autonomous weapons systems: five key human rights issues for consideration”, ​Amnesty international​, 2015, 
25-26  https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ACT3014012015ENGLISH.pdf  
29 
 abetting under the ICC-statute.  In his opinion, all that is needed for criminal accountability 128
is the "knowledge that the acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the commission of a 
specific crime by the principal”, which would be much easier to prove since they should 
know how their systems works.   Neha Jain compares the role of the manufacturer, 129
developers and producers of LAR with the ​I.G Farben ​-case during the Nüremberg-trials 
which established that a company which provided gas for the concentration camps in the 
second world war could be held accountable.  The representatives of I.G Farben were 130
charged with planning, preparing, initiation and waging wars of aggression and invasions on 
other countries and found guilt for almost all indictments.  This proves that a manufacturer 131
of products used in war is not excluded from the possibility of accountability.  
What will be troublesome is that these forms of accountability demand a higher level 
of mens rea than other acts. Therefore, to find someone accountable for aiding and abetting 
with recklessness or negligence as mens rea seems rather unlikely.  What is special for 132
manufacturers, producers and developers is that they are the ones most likely aware of (close 
to) all things the LAR could do. They would therefore be much more aware of the risk of 
deploying them than an operator and therefore fulfill mens rea more easily. However, they 
are as previously stated, far from the field it operates on and it is likely that years have passed 
between the construction and the deployment of the LAR.  As of right now, there are no 133
answers to how criminal accountability should be judged based on these premises.  
It seems as aiding and abetting would be a possible form of accountability for 
manufacturers, producers and developers. Since this has been done before (I.G Farben trial) 
there is a possibility that this could be done again as long as mens rea can be proven. Proving 
mens rea for manufacturers, producers and developers faces the same challenges as for the 
operator, but it could be argue that they at least should have the knowledge of how their 
systems works.  
3.1.4 Criminal accountability for the Commander 
Commander responsibility is build upon the prevention of a crime through the possibility of 
128 Crootof, “War torts,”, 1376. Chengeta, “Accountability Gap,”,​ ​22. 
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 the superiors having effective control over their subordinates.  Commander responsibility is 134
the most interesting form of accountability for the use of LAR and the one that has been most 
debated. There are multiple different ways of looking at and interpreting the doctrine about 
commander responsibility in relation to LAR. The two leading interpretations are that 
accountability cannot be awarded since it is impossible for the commander to foresee the 
action of LAR, and the possibility of creating accountability for the commander through 
negligence or recklessness as mens rea.  
The Commander-soldier relationship could, according to HRW, be used as an analogy 
for the relationship between LAR and the commander,  or the operator and commander. The 135
commander would then be accountable for what the LAR would do in the same way as he or 
she is accountable for other subordinates.  The commander could thus technically be held 136
indirectly accountable for deploying the LAR if it could be proven that he or she by the 
deployment intended to commit a crime and that it could be foreseen.  This would be a 137
direct act.  To, with knowledge, deploy an autonomous system like LAR into an area of 138
anti-personnel would be an example of this.  However, because of the unforeseeability in 139
LAR, both HRW, Amnesty International and Heather Roff argue that it would be 
unreasonable to a hold a commander accountable for anything the LAR does outside of what 
the commander has ordered or could foresee.  In reality, this would be almost all its actions. 140
It would be impossible for a commander to ever have enough knowledge and control of the 
LAR to be able to foresee if the LAR was to do something unlawful. A commander would 
potentially have enough knowledge for accountability if it was communicated what the LAR 
was about to do, but a system that is “out of the loop” doesn’t do that and hence prevents this 
134 Roff,  “Killing in War”, 11. 
135 Human Rights Watch,​ “Mind the Gap:”20-24.  
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 kind of control for the commander.   141
It is interesting to take into consideration what ​actual constructive knowledge ​and 
effective control ​ for the commander entails, and if it would differ depending on if the 
knowledge and control should be over a human subordinate or a LAR. It is undoubtedly so 
that the commander cannot possibly have full control over his’ or her’s human subordinate, 
and is neither required to have that. In relation to cyber crime, it was argued that a 
commander could be held responsible if he or she willfully neglected to understand the 
operations that were undertaken, and the same argumentation could potentially be used for 
AWS systems as well.  The requirement states that a commander must have had the 142
material ability to prevent or punish the offence in the time of its happening in order to be 
said to have effective control and be held accountable.  The possibility of effectively 143
punishing LAR is another tricky part. According to Neha it would be impossible to punish 
any AWS or LAR in an effective way. LAR is neither operated in the same place as the 
commander, or even under direct control of the commander or operator.  Roff also argues 144
that the act of punishing has to involve guilt in the agent being punished, and that this would 
be impossible for LAR without moral agency.  One also has to take into consideration the 145
speed of which LAR system works, which on it is own can make it almost impossible for 
human to keep control over the system.  Hence, it will be impossible for the commander to 146
have actual effective control over LAR on its own. It would also probably not be possible for 
the operator to predict what action the LAR takes, and this too would cause trouble in finding 
the commander accountable for actions of LAR.   147
It has been suggested that testing of AWS should be done to provide commanders 
with a basic knowledge and an expectation of the impact on civilians a deployment of AWS 
141 Human Rights Watch, ​“Mind the Gap:” 20-24.  
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 would cause. If the commander takes the decision to deploy an AWS while he or she knows 
the deployment will cause harm, he or she could be held accountable as an act of recklessness 
or negligence under indirect act of perpetration.  In other words “[...] commanders must 148
(legally) have well-grounded epistemic confidence regarding the range of actions of AWS”.
 However, for there to be accountability, the mens rea for negligence and recklessness 149
would need to be lowered.  It can be questioned if the presented line of reasoning can be 150
used for LAR and not just AWS in general. HRW argue that it could. They mean that the 
doctrine says that a commander can be held accountable if the acts of the robots were 
reasonably​ foreseeable, and UNODA agrees.  This does not require an intent for the exact 151
cause of action and would therefore be easier to prove.   152
Critics mean that this could be dangerous. Kalmanovitz points out a scenario where 
command responsibility is used to create accountability for LAR despite this impossibility of 
constructive control and reasonable foreseeability by the commander. He argue that this 
could undermine and erode the whole doctrine.  An “should have known”-approach, which 153
would be needed for accountability to be established, is therefore undesirable.   154
A command responsibility relationship can be established between the LAR and the 
commander, or the operator and commander, but the unforeseeability in LAR’s action and 
impossibility of punishing it makes it impossible for the commander to exercise effective 
control over LAR. Negligence and recklessness could be used to achieve accountability for 
the commander, but could be dangerous as it can undermine the doctrine. Command 
responsibility for the use of LAR can therefore not be guaranteed.  
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 4. Overcoming the accountability gap  
It can be concluded through the description that there will be an accountability gap between 
LAR and ICL. It can also be concluded that it is not something that is desired in ICL, as the 
wish to end impunity for international crimes is the opposite of an accountattly gap.  
This section will discuss the suggested actions for overcoming the accountability gap 
from an ICL perspective with the goal of ending impunity through deterrence and retribution 
as its point of view. All the suggested actions are therefore assessed with these theories in 
mind.  
The discussion will start with a section about the possibility of overcoming the 
accountability gap through holding LAR themselves accountable as their own entity. The 
discussion will then move on to discussing meaningful human control, which is one of the 
most central debates in regards of accountability for autonomous weapons. Banning of LAR, 
the possibility of using the regulatory framework for accountability for child soldiers and 
strict liability will also be discussed.  
4.1 Overcoming the accountability gap through holding the LAR 
themselves accountable 
In the description, it is shown that one of the issues of the accountability gap is the 
non-human nature of LAR. Through that, it is impossible for entities such as LAR to bear 
criminal accountability under the ICC-statute even though they can conduct criminal acts. 
Therefore, in order to fight the accountability gap, the possibility of extending mens rea and 
the provisions of natural persons in ICC to ​include​ LAR needs to be explored as a possible 
way of overcoming it. 
4.1.1 Would it be technically possible to extend mens rea and natural persons to 
include LAR? 
If it is possible or not to include LAR in the mental element ​ ​and natural persons-provision 
does not have a coherent answer in the litterature. Some argue that it is possible for robots to 
possess the mental element, while most argue that it is not. Hellström means that the mental 
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 element needed for accountability can be fulfilled through the possibility of the robot’s 
algorithms to learn and adapt by being punished.  Sparrow argues that for anything to have 155
mens rea it “must be possible for us to imagine punishing and rewarding it”.  If we see the 156
robot as suffering when being punished, then they could be held accountable for their actions.
  157
 However, most scholars disagree with above arguments and means that freedom of 
intention to act is something that is associated with being a person and not with the possibility 
of being rational.  To be able to rationally have the same moral deliberations as humans 158
does not make you a subject that can be held accountable.  To have a consciousness is 159
argued to be a basis of moral responsibility, and it is because of that it is considered a 
bedrock principle of law and morality that a human being who has training and and who may 
be held accountable should always make the decision to kill.  160
The provision of natural persons and mens rea establishes firmly that only humans 
can be accountable under the ICC-statute. Through this provision, it is easy to see that the 
ICC has taken the view that humans are the center of criminal accountability. The reason why 
ICL takes this view is not something that is indicated in the statute, nor much in literature. 
Jain argues that the human is the center of criminal law because it is impossible for the 
human to extend criminal liability beyond herself.  The human as the subject of criminal 161
accountability is premised on her ability to act as a moral agent and it is when we act as 
moral agents that we can posses intent. She argues that every human is a “wild card” and 
thereby free to choses and complete her own ends, and that this is the reason that 
accountability is based on humans as the final conductor of crimes with no possibility of 
extending it to other entities.  162
 Some believe the natural person provision could effectively be extended to include 
robotic entities, while other argues the only way of doing this would be to extend what 
humans could be accountable for to ​include​ robots.  
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 Sparrow discusses the possibility that ‘artificial agents’ could be a subject under 
criminal accountability.  ​The Committee on Legal Affairs of the European Parliament 163
discussed in relation to Civil law-rules the possibility of an ‘electronic personality’ that could 
bear both rights and obligations. This could be used to create accountability for damage they 
may cause, in relation to civil law rules.  While civil law and criminal law is not the same, 164
the possibility of a softening approach to what can be held accountable through civil liability 
might affect criminal accountability as well.  
Heyns proclaims that a form of accountability which decides ​in advance​ who is to be 
accountable for a robots violations of law could be used.  Krishnana means that a form of 165
‘robot responsibility’, that would look a lot like corporate responsibility, would be a possible 
way of making sure that a robots actions are included under some sort of accountability.  166
These two possibilities share the approach that the provision of natural persons could be 
extended to include responsibility over the robot, but does not hold the robot accountable as 
its own entity. Jain together with Krishnan have argued that the interpretation of it being 
possible to include organisations in the provisions of ‘natural persons’ could open up for 
accountability for other forms of non-human entities, which supports their actions as a 
possibility to overcome the accountability gap for LAR.  167
4.1.2 The possibilities and risks of downgrading mens rea  
In relation to a discussion about widening a scope of an already existing provision or element 
of criminal law, the risk of erosion of accountability needs to be taken into consideration. 
ICRC mentioned in its 2016 report the risk of erosion of accountability if we were to take the 
163 Sparrow also states that it could be possible to hold LAR accountable as “artificial agents” since they causally 
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 human away from the decision making process and moral agency.  It was also stressed by 168
Kalmanovitzt that the possibility of using commander responsibility to award accountability 
for the use of LAR despite the inability to foresee it might risk the whole doctrine, as it 
hollows out the premisses it is built upon.  What is meant by undermining the doctrine is the 169
potential lowering of mens rea for negligence and recklessness in commander responsibility 
to levels that are not compatible with principles of criminal law.   170
Because of the unforeseeability in LAR, there seems a be disagreement on how much 
of the risk and what elements of it a commander must be aware of to be considered negligent. 
If it is considers enough that the commander is aware of the risk, creating accountability for 
the use of LAR would be relatively easy. However, if he or she needs to be aware of that the 
risk is both substantial and unjustifiable, it is harder to create accountability.  Some also 171
argues that since there doesn’t seem to be a consensus of what level of negligence or 
recklessness a commander must be in relation to unforeseeability, a system built upon it 
would be too hypothetical and incoherent to work.   172
The risk of downgrading mens rea in command responsibility might also lead to a risk 
of downgrading or erosion of mens rea in other forms of accountability too, such as 
perpetration.  What effects this downgrading have for other types of criminal accountability 173
are what the critics means has to be taken into consideration.  Through an inclusion of LAR 174
in natural persons and the possibility of changing, lowering or downgrading mens rea in all 
forms of accountability, it would be easier to be held accountable for the use of LAR. The 
problems this might cause wouldn’t be taken into consideration from a retributive 
perspective, as it doesn't focus on future consequences of punishments, but what is morally 
necessary (which is to find accountability). However, from a deterrent perspective, if the 
inclusion of LAR as its own entity would mean that it is possible to hold e.g the commander 
och operator accountable for something that is ​truly​ unforeseeable, this would risk the mere 
foundations of criminal law.  This in turn would risk undermining the deterrent effect 
criminal accountability is supposed to have, as it might conflict with the states views of how 
168 International Committee of the Red Cross,​ “Ethics and autonomous weapon systems:An ethical basis for 
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 criminal accountability should be created and the future benefits of it.  To try and find 175
“scapegoats” by overextending individual accountability just for the sake of holding someone 
accountable and through that overcome the accountability gap  is not beneficial from a 176
deterrent perspective. The goal of ending impunity focuses on the future benefits for society 
by holding the perpetrators accountable. If the victims or other people questions if the person 
found accountable really is the ​right​ person to hold accountable, this goal has not been 
achieved.  
4.1.3 Is it possible to extend mens rea and natural persons and keep the goal of 
ending impunity intact? 
As been stated previously, the goal of ending impunity by accountability for international 
crimes includes both the aspect of deterring future crime and an aspect of providing 
retribution for victims through individual accountability. These two aspects cannot be 
undermined for the goal to stay intact and possible to achieve. 
Let’s suppose that it is possible to hold a LAR, morally and legally, accountable under 
the ICC-statute as some argues it could be. What is then a relevant question to consider is 
how the victims would feel. Do the victims feel the same retributive effect when a LAR is 
held accountable as when a human is held accountable? Probably not. The reason for that is 
the non-human nature of LAR. An important part in feeling a retributive effect is that the 
victims shall feel is that the person that has caused them suffering is being punished for their 
deeds.  LAR, as a system build upon algorithms, machine learning or artificial intelligence, 177
has no feelings, no morale and no life and is therefore both incapable of feeling any form of 
regret for the deedes and suffering they have caused but also impossible to punish in a way 
that would actually affect them or give any effect for the victims.  As a LAR has no life, and 178
therefore cannot die, a LAR could technically spend an entirety in prison without anything 
changing to its mental or emotional state, as it in reality has neither.  
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 Sparrow argues that “To hold that someone is morally responsible is to hold that they 
are appropriate locus of blame or praise and punishment and reward.”.  According to him, a 179
robot could never be an appropriate locus of blame due to their inability to suffer and our 
inability to feel suffering or empathy for them as objects.  If focusing on the word 180
appropriate​ locus of blame, it is easy to agree with Sparrow and say that anything that is not 
human is not an ​appropriate​ locus of blame since victims cannot identify with it. Sparrow 
means that punishments must evoke the right reaction in the object for us to satisfy our need 
for revenge, and means that the appropriate reaction for a punishment is suffering.  For 181
there to be a retributive effect on the use of LAR, there also needs to be relatability and 
empathy by the victims of LAR’s atrocities and the object being punished. This means that as 
long as the robot being punished is not human, does not suffer or is relatable to humans, it is 
not possible for us to feel retribution, regardless of what punishments are given to the robot.  
“Robot responsibility”, as described by Krishnan, and the pre-decided person to hold 
accountable that Henyns suggest means that a human is accountable for the use of a robotic 
entity.  It would not mean that the robot itself would be held accountable. As this type of 182
responsibility defines the “appropriate locus of blame” it will give the retributive effect 
desired. This because a human individual who can suffer is being held accountable, and not 
an entity that is not appropriate or relatable for the victims. 
It can also be questioned what happens to the deterrent effect accountability is 
supposed to have if the LAR themselves were accountable. As said above, most argue that 
the LAR themselves does not possess any consciousness outside of their programming, 
making them incapable to possess mens rea. The deterrent effect criminal accountability is 
supposed to have builds upon, as mentioned in the theory, that future crimes is deterred by 
the possibility of accountability for them. The theory believes that punishment for crimes will 
benefit the future society. In relation to LAR this means that the LAR would need to be 
unwilling ​ of the effect of criminal accountability for there to be a deterrent effect on. As 
previously mentioned, a LAR has no life, purposes or wishes outside of their programming, 
and therefore it is not likely that they would choose to abstain from acting based on the 
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 possibility of accountability. Therefore, when LAR themselves are held accountable, there is 
no deterrent effect of accountability.  
Here it is relevant to take into consideration that a deployment of LAR does involve 
humans in one way or another. The description of the accountability gap has shown that it is 
not the lack of people behind the use of LAR that is the reason for the accountability gap, but 
the unforeseeability of the LAR’s actions and the impossibility of establishing control in the 
use of them that is. For there to be a deterrent effect on e.g. the operation and decision to 
deploy LAR, the ​humans ​ behind the deployment, operation and development needs to be 
unwilling of the possibility of being held accountable. As Sparrow argued, our incapability to 
reach out to and feel suffering for a robotic entity causes us to not have empathy for them  183
and therefore not refraining from deploying a LAR for the possibility of accountability for 
them. For us to refrain from using LAR based on ​their ​ possibility of accountability, we would 
need to feel like it would be unfair and seriously wrong to punish them if they were innocent.
 Therefore, as long as LAR does not makes us feel this way, there need to be humans that 184
are held accountable for there to be a deterrent effect on the use of LAR. A form of 
accountability for the use of LAR that do not define a human as accountable is not interesting 
from neither a retributive, deterrent or ‘fight to end impunity’-perspective. It is the process of 
identification or recognition between the victims and the perpetrator, and the possibility of 
accountability for the ​human​ that we can feel empathy for that cause this retributive and 
deterrent effect needed for the goal of ending impunity to be fulfilled. If we want to uphold 
the goal of ending impunity through criminal accountability in the way that it was intended, 
there needs to be a human to blame for the crimes LAR cause. As criminal accountability 
under the ICC-statute also needs humans to create accountability, an option where one is not 
identified is undesired. The ICRC argues the same way and says that “a human is a 
requirement in accountability, as accountability is a human responsibility”.   185
This conclusion means that the only option to overcome the accountability is through 
actions that establish a human as accountable.  
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 4.2 Overcoming the accountability gap through meaningful human 
control  
One of the hottest debates in the field of LAR and accountability is the definition of 
meaningful human control. A definition of meaningful human control aims at ensuring that 
LAR and likewise technology stay under human control. It has been argued that the word 
“meaningful” emphasis the importance of there being a human that bears the moral 
responsibility for a crime.   186
As of right now, there is no agreed definition about what meaningful human control 
is.  Even though there is no agreed definition, most seems to agree on that some degree of 187
control over critical functions in autonomous systems is needed,  and that all systems should 188
be subject to some form of human involvement.  The fast changing technology surrounding 189
LAR is challenging the work towards definition, as it forces the discussion to forgo what the 
future AWS technology will look like.  Mireille Hildebrandt argues that by allowing 190
artificial intelligence in law we have to reinvent law to fit it, which is highly visible in this 
context.  Finding a consensus of what the actual issue to be fought by the definition of 191
meaningful human control is might be as hard as finding the definition itself.  
The debate about meaningful human control mainly concerns what should be included 
in the defintion.  There are different proposals to what a definition about meaningful human 192
control should entail or look like. ICRC and the organisation Article 36 propose that 
meaningful human control should include factors such as predictability, reliability and 
transparency. The proposal also includes that the users shall be able to intervene in the 
process and understand the information so that accountability for the action of the system can 
be established.  They mean that it is not meaningful human control when a user of an 193
186 Horowitz, Scharre, “A primer”, 8.  
187 “Time to get serious about banning killer robots”, Amnesty International. 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/11/time-to-get-serious-about-banning-killer-robots/  
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191 Mireille Hildebrandt “Law ​as ​ computation in the era of artificial legal intelligence Speaking law to the power 
of statistics”, ​University of Toronto Law Journal,​ ​68:1, 2018, ​16. 
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 autonomous system press a button to fire when a computer has indicated it appropriate.  194
UNODA has established in an report that the control needed over AWS is “(a) verified 
technical performance of the weapon system for its intended use, as determined at the 
development stage; (b) manipulation of operational parameters at the development and 
activation stages; and (c) human supervision and potential for intervention and deactivation 
during the operation stage.”  195
Meaningful human control is generally viewed in two different ways. The first is that 
the requirement of meaningful human control already exist in IHL. Center for a New 
American Security states that “meaningful human control should be viewed as a principle for 
the design and use of weapons systems in order to ensure that their use can comply with the 
laws of war.”  This argument has its basis in that the rules applicable are the same for a 196
human pulling the trigger as a human that launches an unmanned or autonomous system.  197
The second view is that meaningful human control would be a separate and additional 
concept to the law. In this view, meaningful human control is a new principles to the laws of 
war and should be treated with as much consideration as proportionality, distinction, military 
necessity, etc. This view also argues that meaningful human control has been a “hidden” 
principles in law, and needs to be recognised and defined as a new principle to be activated. 
  198
It is important for the definition of meaningful human control to find a universal 
definition of autonomy, and especially what is considered full anatomy. Each level of 
autonomy cannot be set too low or to high, as it would either infringe on technology that is 
already in use and important to states today, or not broad enough to cover the technology that 
needs regulation.  199
The possibility of programming and building LAR so that they don’t breach any IHL 
or ICL rules and therefore don’t cause an accountability gap is another proposed solution.  200
This action relates to the discussion of meaningful human control and can essentially be seen 
as a technological way of making sure that we have meaningful human control over LAR. 
194 ​Ekelhof​, “Autonomous weapons: Operationalizing meaningful human control”.  
195 Davidson “A Legal perspective”, 15. 
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 Proclaimer of this solutions means that it will be possible to overcome the accountability gap 
through software programming, and that this might even enforce IHL and ICL rules more 
efficiently than humans could.  Hildebrandt has also argued that protection by design in data 201
driven architecture (which a LAR would be as an autonomous system) is a possibility. 
However, the only way of securing this development is though mandatory provisions in law.
 This means that the possibility of of building LAR that satisfy ICL and IHL rules rests 202
upon there being a law that obliges states and developers to do so. 
The deterrent effect a definition about meaningful human control would have is not 
something that is discussed within the CCW. The CCW is mostly concerned with how LAR 
breaches IHL rules. Despite this, if one look at meaningful human control from an ICL 
perspective, one can see that a definition would most likely have a deterrent effect on the use 
of LAR. As the point of a definition of meaningful human control is to ensure that the LAR is 
always in control by humans, the most likely effect the definition will have is that it would 
not be possible for various actor to claim that the conduct of a LAR was unforeseeable. 
Through that, mens rea could be established for those that deploy or decide to deploy LAR. 
This means that it would be possible to award accountability for operators and commanders 
of LAR in a way that would be acceptable in criminal law.  
Meaningful human control would also affect the programmers, manufacturers and 
developers of LAR since creating or developing technology that is not within the control of 
humans would be prohibited. If this was done despite this, it could lead to accountability for 
them. Meaningful human control therefore causes technological effects to the developments 
of LAR, as it forces technology to stay within control of humans. It also establishes a moral 
requirement as it forces accountability upon the users of the systems. A definition would then 
also lead to that all persons which face a possibility of accountability could assess their action 
before undertaking them, which is an important factor to achieve long standing deterrent 
effect.  
 However, what might happen to ICC’s forms of accountability, is that it might be 
easier or harder to ​practically ​ award accountability. Let’s suppose that a definition about 
meaningful human control is found. Despite a definition in place, it might be hard to award 
201 Heather M. Roff,​ “​The Strategic Robot Problem: Lethal Autonomous Weapons in War”,​ ​Journal of Military 
Ethics, ​13:3 (2014), 213. 
202 Mireille Hildebrandt “Saved by Design? The Case of Legal Protection by Design”, ​Nanoethics ​ (2017) 11: 
307​. ​1, 2, 4. 
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 accountability for the use of weapons that pass this definition, as it would involve both 
establishing the criminal act conducted (all the acts a LAR conducts doesn’t have to be of 
criminal nature), establishing the person or persons who are accountable for the act and then 
prove mens rea for this person or persons. Meaningful human control would therefore always 
include a grey area of accountability between the technologies that fall within the definition 
of meaningful human control and those that fall outside of it. Especially challenging to this 
grey area is the type of technology that fall within the scope of meaningful human control to 
begin with and then continues to develop towards higher levels of autonomy.  This grey 203
area is still an accountability gap, but much smaller than it would have been without a 
definition. If we want to enforce the goal of ending impunity through deterrence and 
retribution to its fullest potential, meaningful human control is not the best option to 
overcome it.  
4.3 Overcoming the accountability gap through a ban of LAR 
A total ban of LAR, and technology alike, has a wide recognition and support. For example 
HRW , Amnesty International ,  the campaign to stop killer robots , thousands of 204 205 206
scholars and influential company leaders through The Future of Life Institute open letter  207
and the UN Secretary-General António Guterres  have all called for a ban of LAR and/or 208
AWS. The well known scholar Sparrow argued as early as 2007 for what most agree on, that 
it is unethical to use an autonomous system if no one could be accountable for them.   209
Weapons that has been deemed too dangerous or beyond what human can control has 
previously been banned, e.g. land mines, bio-weapons and chemical weapons.  This shows 210
that a common way of handling situations where the control of a weapon is slipping between 
203 ​International Committee of the Red Cross, ​“Autonomous weapon systems, technical, military, legal and 
humanitarian aspects”, 47.  
204 ​Human Rights Watch,​ “Mind the gap,”, 5.  
205 “UN: Ban killer robots before their use in policing puts lives at risk”,​ Amnesty International,​ 2015. 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/04/ban-killer-robots-before-their-use-in-policing-puts-lives-at-risk
/  
206 Campaign to stop killer robots,​ “Retaining human control of weapons systems: Briefing Note,”. 
207 ​Future of Life institute, ​“Autonomous weapons: An Open Letter,”. 
208 “UN head calls for ban”, ​Amnesty international,​ 2018. https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/2018/11/unban/  
209 ​Sparrow, “​Killer Robots” ​, 66. 
210 “A Guide to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement”, 
International Committee of the Red Cross ​, 2006, 941-942. 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_864_icrc_geneva.pdf  
44 
 the fingers of the humans is to ban it, not to try and decide how we can still regain control of 
it.  
However, not everyone is in favour of a prohibition of LAR. Some scholars mean that 
it would be better to regulate the use of it and that individual accountability is not a relevant 
element for the legality of weapons.  If accountability for the use of weapon is considered a 211
part of art. 36 AP1 or not depends on how you view the existing provision. In the section 
above about meaningful human control, it is shown that some have argued that individual 
accountability is a part of art. 36 AP1, while some have argued that it is not. Heyns 
recognises however that accountability is important for the weapon review , and from an 212
ICL perspective, individual human accountability is the key element for a deterrent and 
retributive use of LAR and the fight to end impunity.  
It is undoubtedly so that no accountability gap would arise if the technology that 
caused it was not used or developed. A ban would mean that the one deciding to deploy and 
actually deploy LAR would breach international law. There is no denying in the fact that a 
ban would have the deterrent effect desired, as LAR could not be used without facing 
accountability and the accountability gap would thus be overcome. It would be clear for all 
actors that the deployment, use or development of these weapons are prohibited, and it would 
be possible to attribute accountability for both commanders, operators, developers, producers 
and manufacturers.  From a deterrent perspective, foreseeability of action in relation to 213
accountability is crucial to achieve a deterrent effect in the long run. However, as was stated 
in the section of meaningful human control, the attraction to technology like LAR might be 
too big and too beneficial for states to agree on a total ban of it. The process of developing 
LAR might have gone too far for states to be okay with discontinuing them.  Some also 214
argues that it is the impunity of using AWS that is attractive to states.  This argument is 215
essentially the opposite of what ICL tries to achieve through their fight to end impunity for 
international crimes and only show how important accountability is for there to be a deterrent 
effect to the use of LAR.  
211Charles J. Jr. “Accountability and autonomous weapons: much ado about nothing”, ​65- 66. 
212 ​International Committee of the Red Cross,​ “Autonomous weapon systems, technical, military, legal and 
humanitarian aspects”,  47.  
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214 Crootof, “The Killer Robots”​, ​1884. 
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 If you compare the outcome of meaningful human control to the possibility that LAR 
would be banned altogether, you will see that the same problems won’t arise. A ban would 
make it clear that deploying, using or developing LAR is a violation of the law. From a fight 
against impunity-perspective, a total ban might be the best way to overcome the 
accountability gap, if you want to achieve the biggest deterrent an retributive effect. The grey 
area that meaningful human control could cause would not happen if LAR was banned. The 
risk of a continued development of weapons that would cause a grey area of accountability 
would not exist, and therefore the risk of someone being held accountable when they were 
truly not in control of the weapon would also not exist. To ban LAR altogether is therefore 
the better alternative to overcome the accountability gap.  
4.4 Overcoming the accountability gap through an analogy to the 
regulation of child soldiers  
Hin-Yan Liu has argued that the regulatory framework surrounding child soldiers, which both 
establishes a prohibition of recruiting children under 15 years old as soldiers and 
accountability for it in the ICC-statute, can be used as inspiration for how to regulate AWS.  216
While he affirms that the regulation of accountability for child soldiers is for the protection of 
children, he argues that AWS and child soldiers share similar tendencies as neither can be 
held individually accountable for their crimes.  217
The accountability gap between criminal acts performed by child soldiers and their 
incapability of individual accountability has been solved through the criminalization of those 
who recruit and employ child soldiers, regardless of the acts the child soldier has performed.
 Liu means that the impunity of using AWS could be avoided if the use and introduction of 218
such “irresponsible systems” as AWS and LAR were criminalised. Through this, the 
possibility of “scapegoating” through excessive extension of individual accountability, is also 
avoided.  As individual accountability could be established, Liu argues that this could cause 219
a deterrent effect on the technical development of AWS so that systems that violates this are 
not developed.  A regulation would most likely have the same effect on LAR. 220
216 Liu, “Refining responsibility:,”, 342-343. 
217 ibid., 342-343. 
218 Liu “Refining responsibility:,”, 343. 
219 ibid., 343. 
220 ibid., 343. 
46 
 In relation to deterrence and retribution in the goal of ending impunity, it was argued 
in previous sections that there is a need for a human individual to be held accountable for this 
to be achieved. As this approach to overcoming the accountability gap would provide the 
accountability directly upon the individual,  this would satisfy the need for individual 221
accountability in retribution for the victims, as well as cause the deterrent effect desired for 
the humans behind the systems.  
The main problem with this approach lies in the fact that child soldiers are viewed as 
victims of international crime and the regulatory framework is created to protect them from 
the atrocities of war.  The same reasoning cannot be extended to AWS,  and neither LAR. 222 223
The analogy between child soldiers and AWS therefore strongly differs in its fundamental 
basis.  As LAR is not a victim of international crimes and we don’t feel any empathy for 224
them as entities, to analogy compare the two would be to “imply the existence of a trait that is 
not actually there”.  Crootof means that the difference between AWS, LAWS and LAR 225
should be the basis of the discussion of accountability, not that they are all autonomous.   226
The question is thus if we are willing to create accountability for the commander, 
operator of manufacture to overcome the accountability gap and enforce the goal of ending 
impunity based on analogy that is controversial? From a retributive perspective, this would 
not be an issue as the future effects of the awardment of accountability is not relevant, and the 
most important aspect is that the one guilty of the crime is found accountable. From a 
deterrent perspective however, this approach would not be the best as it could affect the 
authority of ICL as a body of law if states were to question its provisions and reasoning for 
creating accountability.  
4.5 Overcoming the accountability gap through strict liability  
Strict liability for the use of autonomous system in general is something that has been greatly 
discussed. There is no denying in the fact that strict liability has deterrent effect on the use 
and development of systems and products. However not for LAR. Strict liability is not 
221 Liu “Refining responsibility:,”., 344. 
222 Rebecca Crootof, “Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Limits of Analogy” ​Harvard National Security 
Journal, ​vol 9 2018, 57. 
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 something that is used to create criminal accountability. Some argue that the absence of mens 
rea, which is a cornerstone for accountability in criminal law, makes a strict liability approach 
incompatible with ‘nulla poena sine culpa’ ( ​no penalty without fault) ​.   227
Even if strict liability could be used, LAR would not be subject to strict liability rules, 
as it does not apply to the military and its operations.  This means that the major area of 228
deployment of LAR would not be covered by any accountability at all, as long as the IHL 
rules such as e.g necessity and proportionality are fulfilled.  Here it can be questioned if 229
these rules could ever be fulfilled by a LAR as a fully autonomous system, but that discussion 
is outside the scope of this thesis. So while the thought of allowing the deployment of LAR 
and base accountability on the possibility of financial reparations for victims sounds practical 
and in line with the goal of ending impunity from both a deterrent and retributive perspective, 
is it not possible if the accountability gap is to be overcome between LAR and ICL as it 
would not apply in situations were LAR is used.   230
5. Conclusion 
5.1 What are the grounds of accountability in international criminal 
law and how does LAR corresponds with these forms of 
accountability?  
Through the description process, it can be concluded that scholars do not always agree with 
each other on where the accountability gap would be and what it would look like. The 
description shows how the docrinte, despite the disagreements between scholars, views the 
potential accountability gap between LAR and ICL, something that is an important basis for 
the thesis. 
Most scholars are convinced that LAR is not a moral agent and therefore cannot be 
held accountable as their own entity as they cannot possess mens rea. Some argues 
differently, and means that they could learn from mistakes and therefore have moral agency. 
227 Crootof, “War Torts,”, 1387. 
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 Most agree on that this does not give someone moral agency. As a LAR is neither a natural 
person, it cannot be accountable under the ICC-statute. It is therefore not possible to hold the 
LAR themselves accountable.  
It is technically possible to hold the operator accountable, as long as intent and 
foreseeability for the action of the LAR could be proven for the operator. However, as the 
operator neither has ordered nor has control over the LAR after deployment, most argues that 
it is impossible and unreasonable to hold the operator accountable. It can be concluded that 
the unforeseeability in LAR’s action makes it hard for the operator of the LAR to fulfill both 
actus reus and mens rea and accountability can therefore not be guaranteed.  
It is argued that producers, manufacturers and developers of LAR possibly can be 
held accountable if it could be proven that they willfully programmed a system that breached 
international law. Some argues however that the producers, manufacturers and developers 
impossibility of foreseeing where and when their programs or products will be used and that 
the act of involvement in a criminal act does not automatically count for criminal 
accountability will make it unlikely for them to bear accountability. The fact that the 
producers, manufacturers and developers also are far from the scene of combat, both in time 
and space makes direct accountability unlikely. The possibility of producers, manufacturers 
and developers being held accountable for aiding and abetting seems more likely as the I.G 
Farben case has established it as possible. Mens rea for aiding and abetting is however higher 
and to use recklessness or negligence as mens rea seems unlikely. The possibility of holding 
producers, manufacturers and developers of LAR accountable can therefore not be 
guaranteed either. 
Accountability through commander responsibility is a complicated matter. By 
definition, a commander that willfully allowed the deployment of LAR into an area knowing 
that it would cause harm punishable by law could be held accountable. However, the 
unforeseeability, the remoteness from the battlefield and impossibility to properly and 
effectively punish and control LAR makes it impossible for the commander to have the 
constructive knowledge and effective control to prevent the crime that he or she needs to be 
held accountable under command responsibility. Accountability could possibly be created 
through negligence and recklessness for an indirect act, since they only require that the crime 
was reasonable foreseeable for the commander. However, this might undermine the whole 
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 doctrine of command responsibility. Accountability for commanders is thus not something 
that can be guaranteed. 
Through the process of describing the accountability gap, it can be concluded that the 
unforeseeability and lack of control over LAR, as well as the non human nature of LAR is the 
reason for the accountability gap. This because no form of accountability available can 
guarantee​ accountability for the deployment of LAR and therefore does the accountability 
gap exist for all forms of accountability available in the ICC-statute. As no form of 
accountability can be guaranteed, there is a risk of impunity when using LAR. What the 
accountability gap looks like depends on how the provisions of ICC-statute are interpreted, 
e.g how much you can stretch mens rea for a negligent commander, how LAR actually will 
work (no LAR yet exists) and how IHL will deal with the problem LAR will cause article 36 
AP1. No definitive answers can yet be given other than that the autonomous nature of LAR 
makes both mens rea and actus reus hard to fulfill for all actors, and that this causes the 
accountability gap.  
5.2 In the light of ICL’s goals of ending impunity through 
accountability, how can the accountability gap between ICL and LAR 
be overcome, if at all? 
One part of the accountability gap is based in the non human nature of LAR. In the 
ICC-statute, it is impossible to hold a perpetrator that is not human accountable for crimes, 
because it is firstly not a natural person and secondly cannot possess mens rea, both of which 
is a requirement for accountability. Therefore, one way to overcome the accountability gap 
would be to extend the possibility of accountability to non-human entities, and through that 
find the LAR themselves accountable. To do that ICL would need to stretch its provisions of 
natural persons and mens rea. If this is possible or not is not something that can be decided, 
as it depends on the argumentation put forward. Most however seems to agree on that it 
would not be possible.  
What can be clearly decided however is that it would not be possible to extend mens 
rea to LAR in regards of ICL’s goal of ending impunity through deterrence and retribution. 
For vicitm’s retribution there needs to be human subjects held accountable, and if LAR was 
given status as a natural person or the ability to possess mens rea, this theory would fail. The 
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 deterrent effect over the use of LAR also need humans, and hence will the possibility of 
awarding accountability to the LAR itself not be an option to overcome the accountability 
gap.  
Therefore, if ICL want to keep their goal of ending impunity through deterrence and 
retribution intact, the only option to overcome the accountability gap is through establishing 
human entities for accountability in the deployment and use of LAR.  
The proposed actions discussed to overcome the accountability gap are meaningful 
human control, technological restrictions to LAR so that they would not be in violation of the 
law, a total ban, analogy to the regulation of child soldiers and strict liability.  
From ICL’s point of view, these action all serve the same purpose. As argued above, 
ICL needs human subjects in order to fulfill its requirements of mens rea and natural persons, 
as well as for the deterrent and retributive effect to work as intended. For ICL’s goal of 
ending impunity, as long as the discussion of overcoming the accountability gap focuses 
finding a human subject, ICL will work. Therefore, the exact methods of overcoming the 
accountability gap is of less importance to ICL, as long as it involves a human subject that 
can be identified and held accountable. All the suggested actions discussed provide this, 
which means that as long as one of them is chosen, the accountability gap between LAR and 
ICL will be overcome with the goal of ending impunity through deterrence and retribution 
intact. 
What can however be concluded is that from an ICL perspective, a total ban of LAR 
would be the best way of overcoming the accountability gap. Meaningful human control still 
causes a grey area between banned and legal technology, which would still be an 
accountability gap (but smaller), the analogy to the regulation of child soldiers compares two 
compounds that is (perhaps too) controversial to compare and strict liability would not apply 
to LAR in most situations where it would be used. If the goal is to fight impunity for the use 
of LAR and to deter future crimes in the most effective way and making sure that the victims 
gets their retribution, a ban of LAR would be the most secure option as is gives the biggest 
deterrent effect and awards accountability the easiest.  
It can be concluded that in the light the goal of ending impunity by deterrence and 
victim’s retribution there needs to be human subjects to hold accountable to overcome the 
accountability gap. It is of lesser importance how the human subjects are found, as long as 
they are, but the easiest and best way would be through a ban of LAR.  
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 Therefore, it can at last be concluded that while everyone agrees on that impunity for 
international crimes is something that needs to be avoided, the introduction of LAR in 
warfare and the possibility of an accountability gap between LAR and ICL means that we 
need to take into consideration what this can do to this goal. Until now, everyone seems to 
have thought that as long as meaningful human control in weapons can be secured, the 
possible accountability gap between LAR and ICL will be overcome. Though this thesis it 
can however be concluded that while meaningful human control will help overcome the 
accountability gap, it is not the best option to chose. Instead, the best possible way to 
overcome the accountability gap is though a ban of LAR, as a ban establishes both desired 
deterrent effect and secure retribution for the victims. To find a solution that causes a 
deterrent effect though criminal accountability for the use of LAR and gives the victims a 
possibility of retribution though individual ​ human​ accountability is crucial to achieve the goal 
of ending impunity for international crimes.  
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